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FORFEITURE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
By HENRY W. BALLANTINE*
I. IMPLIED CONDITIONS; EFFECT OF BREACH AFTER PART
PERFORMANCE.
A S Professor Williston points out,' few questions in the law
are more difficult to solve than that concerning the
right of one who has broken his contract to recover for such bene-
fits as he may have conferred by part performance. No solution
can be entirely satisfactory because two guiding principles of
legal-policy pull in different ways. On the one hand to allow a
party to stop performance when he pleases and sell his part
performance at a value fixed by the jury countenances unfaith-
fulness and may be regarded in effect as imposing a new con-
tract on the defendant. On the other hand to deny the party in
default any recovery will often give the defendant far more than
fair compensation for the non-completion of the contract and im-
pose on the plaintiff an unjust forfeiture.
It is the general American rule that a material breach of con-
tract by the plaintiff will excuse the defendant from the duty of
going forward with the executory portions of a contract. Should
it also excuse the defendant from the duty of paying for the bene-
fits received by part performance? If strict or complete perform-
ance is an express condition precedent to a party's right to the
counter performance, he will generally be left entirely .without
remedy, contractual or quasi contractual. The same result is often
supposed to follow from breach of an implied condition, though
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1 3 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1473.
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the other party may receive value from what he has done far
greater than the damages caused by the breach. It is the purpose
of this paper to discuss the question of the loss of the benefits of
pirt performance, first as resulting from breach of implied condi-
tions, and second, as resulting from express conditions.
In many jurisdictions the rigid rule has been announced,
founded on the policy of securing the faithful performance of
contracts, that no recovery whatever will be allowed to a party in
serious default under an entire contract. 2 The mere fact that
partial performance is beneficial to the other party is not ordi-
narily enough to raise an obligation to pay for it.3 To allow re-
covery for partial performance, the circumstances must be such
that a new contract may be implied. The right to recover de-
pends on defendant's election to accept with knowledge of the de-
fault.' Where there is no evidence of acceptance of partial per-
formance such as to show a waiver of conditions or a new prom-
ise, the plaintiff who has failed in full and substantial perform-
ance of an entire contract cannot recover anything either on the
contract itself or in quantum meruit. 4
In the case of building contracts where the contractor has ex-
pended labor and material upon the land of another which cannot
be returned to him, but which must necessarily be retained by the
owner of the land, the rule is generally adopted that the owner
must pay for substantial performance, and in some jurisdictions
for partial performance, after full allowance for defects.' The
doctrine of substantial performance has been stated to apply
where a builder has in good faith substantially performed, but
there are minor defects which may be so remedied that the owner
will have in substance that for which he contracted. The builder
may recover on the contract the agreed price less such deduction
2 Smith v. Brady, (1858) 17 N. Y. 173, 72 Am. Dec. 442; 2 Williston,
Sec. 841, 1475.
3 Elliott v. Caldwell, (1890) 43 Minn. 357, 45 N. W. 845; Johnson v.
Fehsefeldt, (1908) 106 Minn. 202, 118 N. W. 797; Hoglund v. Sortedahl,
(1907) 101 Minn. 359, 112 N. W. 408; Anderson v. Pringle, (1900) 79
Minn. 433, 82 N. W. 682; Uldrickson v. Samdahl, (1904) 92 Minn. 297,
100 N. W. 5.
4 Sumpter v. Hedges, L. R., [1898] 1 Q. B. 673, (Builder abandoned
a lump sum contract); Taulbee v. McCarty, (1911) 144 Ky. 199, 137 S. W.
1045, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 143, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 456. See also Bentley v.
Edwards, (1914) 125 Minn. 179; 146 N. W. 347, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 254;
Ptacek v. Pisa, (1907) 231 Ill. 522, 83 N. E. 221; 6 R. C. L. 972, 973;
Morrison, Rescission of Contracts, 107. Decennial Dig. secs. 297, 319, 320.
5 Leeds v. Little, (1890) 42 Minn. 414, 418, 44 N. W. 309.
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as will suffice to cure the defects.6 In building and construction
contracts very often slight omissions or defects may occur, not-
withstanding the most honest, diligent, and competent effort to
perform in every respect in accordance with the contract. Literal
compliance in every detail cannot be required in practical affairs.
Substantial performance is sufficient if it accomplishes all the pur-
poses of the thing contracted for, so that an allowance out of the
contract price will give full indemnity to the owner. This relief
is given in view of the fact that the owner cannot restore the con-
tractor to his former position, and the contractor would other-
wise suffer great loss to the enrichment of the owner. According
to the better view, the remedy is allowed on the express contract.
According to other courts, the remedy is on quantum meruit even
if performance is substantial.7
The doctrine of substantial performance, however, does not
apply where omissions or departures from the contract are inten-
tional, or so serious as not to be capable of remedy or of compen-
sation by allowance from the contract price. The mere fact that
partial performance is beneficial to a party is not enough to raise
an obligation to pay for it, at least where he has no option to reject
or return it." The policy of securing full performance of con-
tracts and of discouraging parties from abandoning their en-
gagements or performing them as their interest or caprice may
dictate, is felt to forbid a mbre liberal measure of relief. The
severity of the rule as to entire contracts is relaxed only in cases
of oversight, inadvertence, or excusable mistake, easily suscep-
tible of remedy.
It is said that the purpose of the doctrine of substantial per-
formance is to secure substantial justice between man and man
by relaxing, in proper cases, the rigid and in practice, sometimes
harsh rule of the common law as to the entirety of contractsf.
But the courts cannot extend it to enable parties to contracts to
abandon them and recover on a quantum meruit whenever they
may find it for their interest to do so.
It is sometimes assumed that the "original rule (of the com-
mon law) requires proof of exact and literal performance of all
6 Snider v. Peters Home Bldg. Co., (1918) 139 Minn. 413, 167 N. W.
108.
7 Foeller v. Heintz, (1908) 137 Wis. 169, 118 N. W. 543, 24 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 327 n.
8 Uldrickson v. Samdahl, (1904) 92 Minn. 297, 100 N. W. 5; Elliott
v. Caldwell, (1890) 43 Minn. 357, 45 N: W. 845.
9 Anderson v. Pringle, (1900) 79 Minn. 433, 435, 82 N. W. 682.
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the terms and conditions of a contract as a condition precedent
to the right of recovery by the contractor."10 It is supposed that
this "original rule" has been "relaxed" out of the "charity of the
law" by the doctrine of substantial performance. But this is an
error. The doctrine of substantial performance dates back at least
to Lord Mansfield's judgment in Boone v. Eyre in 1777, and ob-
tained in England for many years, although later the English
courts held strict performance necessary and treated implied con-
ditions in bilateral contracts like express conditions. They have
now gone back to the doctrine of substantial performance. As
Professor A. L. Corbin has pointed out :11
"If the defendant has not stipulated that performance by plaintiff
shall be a condition precedent to his own active duty, but has
merely caused the plaintiff to make a promise and thus undertake
a duty on his own part, then the court need not require any per-
formance at all by the plaintiff as a condition precedent to the
defendant's duty, and if it requires any performance at all as a
condition it is fair and just to require only substantial perform-
ance as such condition."
As Mitchell, J. said :1
"Substantial, and not exact performance, accompanied by entire
good faith, is all that the law requires in the case of any contract
to enable a party to recover on it."
This is particularly the case with reference to right to recover
where the defective performance has been accepted, as contrasted
with the right to continue with a contract and demand an accep-
tance of defective performance." A buyer, for example, need not
accept a larger or smaller quantity than that bargained for, nor
need he accept goods of a different kind or of an inferior qual-
ity.' 4 But one cannot "while he retains the benefits of a substantial
performance, totally defeat an action for the price he has agreed
to pay, or for specific performance of the contract on his part,
on the ground that the plaintiff has not completed the perform-
ance required of him by the contract. He cannot at the same
time affirm the contract by retaining its benefits and rescind
10Hoglund v. Sortedahl, (1907) 101 Minn. 359, 112 N. W. 408; 6 R.
C. L. 966; 5 Page, Contracts, Sec. 2778.
"x Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 28 Yale L. Jour. 739, 759. See
Morrison, Rescission of Contracts, 115.
12 Peterson v. Mayer, (1891) 46 Minn. 468, 49 N. W. 245, 13 L. R. A.
72; Brown v. Hall, (1913) 121 Minn. 61, 65, 140 N. W. 128.
13 Compare Boone v. Eyre, (1777) 1 Henry B. 273 n. with Ellen v.
Topp, (1851) 6 Exch. 424, Graves v. Legg, (1854) 9 Exch. 709, and
Glazebrook v. Woodrow, (1799) 8 Term. Re p. 366.
'4 5 Minn. Law Rev. 216; 2 Williston, Contracts, Secs. 844, 1009.
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it by repudiating its burdens."'" This rule applies to contracts
of all kinds, to contracts for building and construction, for the
sale of real estate, and for the manufacture and sale of goods.
Many cases of part performance, however, cannot be brought
within the doctrine of substantial performance even if it is liber-
ally applied.16 An unjust forfeiture will often result from deny-
ing all recovery to a plaintiff even if he is materially in default.
The weight of authority now allows a builder whose breach
of contract is not willful, to recover the value of his work less
the damages caused by his default.'7  The recovery is allowed
not on the contract but in quasi contract, on the ground that it
is not fair that the defendant should profit at the plaintiff's
expense.
A few jurisdictions, including Minnesota, however, deny
partial recovery where the builder has not substantially per-
formed.18 A failure of performance in any material or substan-
tial respect will defeat any recovery on quantum meruit for the
value of what has been done in partial performance. 1
In case of willful abandonment or culpable departure from
duty by the plaintiff, the fear of putting a premium upon delib-
erate breach of contract or giving it any indulgence, has led
many courts to hold that sound public policy requires a forfeit-
ure, a denial of all right of recovery in any form whatever.20 A
rule which would enable a party to abandon his contract and
lose nothing thereby would have a tendency to encourage bad
faith and lessen the binding force of contracts." But can it be
15 German Say. Inst. v. De La Vergne R. M. Co., (1895) 70 Fed. 146;
Rosenthal P. Co. v. National, etc., Co., (1919) 226 N. Y. 313, 123 N. E.
761; Kauffman v Raeder, (1901) 108 Fed. 171, 54 L. R. A. 247, 242;
5 Page, Contracts, Secs. 2785, 2786, 2788.
163 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1475; Bentley v. Edwards, (1914) 125
Minn. 179, 146 N. W. 347, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 254.
17 Dermott v. Jones, (1859) 23 How. (U.S.) 220, 16 L. Ed. 442; Pinches
v. Swedish Church, (1887) 55 Conn. 183, 10 Atl. 264; Woodford v.
Kelly, (1904) 18 S. Dak. 615, 101 N. W. 1069; Hayward v. Leonard,
(1828) 7 Pick. (Mass.) 181, 19 Am. Dec. 68; Dakin v. Lee, [1916] 1
K. B. 566.
18 Uldrickson v. Samdahl, (1904) 92 Minn. 297, 100 N. W. 5; see also,
Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, (1908) 106 Minn. 202, 118 N. W. 797.
19 Elliott v. Caldwell, (1890) 43 Minn. 357, 45 N. W. 845; Waite v.
Shoemaker & Co., (1915) 50 Mont. 264, 146 Pac. 736; Riddell v. Peck-
Williamson Co., (1902) 27 Mont. 44, 66 Pac. 241; Steel Storage Co. v.
Stock, (1919) 225 N. Y. 173, 121 N. E. 786; C. B. Morrison, Rescission
of Contracts, 121.
20 Woodward, Quasi Contracts, Sec. 166.
21 6 R. C. L. 974; Elliott v. Caldwell, (1890) 43 Minn. 357, 45 N. W.
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laid down without qualification that any willful breach on plain-
tiff's part should prevent any recovery by him even for sub-
stantial performance? Such a rule seems altogether too severe.
The law should consider the degree of moral delinquency, the
extent of non-performance, and the ratio of damages to bene-
fits received.2 2  It should establish a rule "which weighs the
effect of the default, and adjusts the rigor of the remedy to the
gravity of the wrong. '2
Some courts hold that even a party who willfully breaks a
contract of employment may recover for-the value of work done
in excess of the damages caused by the breach. The leading au-
thority on this point is the much mooted case of Britton v. Tur-
ner.21 It was there held that one who voluntarily abandons a
contract of employment after large part performance, may re-
cover to the extent of benefits conferred on the employer, after
deducting the damages resulting from his breach. But in Minne-
sota and a majority of the American jurisdictions, it is held that
the employee can recover nothing for part performance of an
entire contract in case of willful abandonment or discharge for
good cause .2  To punish a willful breach, exemplary damages
might be allowed in the discretion of the court or jury. But to
compel an arbitrary, mechanical, automatic forfeiture of all pay
where the defendant has received and keeps the benefit of
valuable services, especially where the contract is nearly com-
pleted, is crudely severe, like capital punishment for all felonies.
There is no relation between the damage done to the defendant
by the breach and the amount given to the employer by way of
forfeiture. The longer the plaintiff serves, the more he is pun-
ished. Would it not be sufficient to prescribe attorneys' fees or
a discretionary penalty? Even willful wrong-doing is not to
be punished arbitrarily without regard to the degree of culpa-
bility or the loss or injury inflicted.26
22 See Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 28 Yale L. Jour.
739, 761.23"Cardozo, J., in Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, Inc., (1918) 222
N. Y. 449, 451, 119 N. E. 113.24(1834) 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713; 6 R. C. L. 975.
25 Nelichka v. Esterlty, (1882) 29 Minn. 145, 15 N. W. 668; Peterson
v. Mayer (1891) 46 Minn. 468, 49 N. W. 245; Von Heyne v. Tompkins,
(1903) 89 Minn. 77, 93 N. W. 901, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 524; Johnson v.
Fehsefeldt, (1908) 106 Minn. 202, 118 N. W. 797; Sipley v. Stickney,(1906) 190 Mass. 43, 76 N. E. 226, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 469; 3 Williston,
Contracts, Sec. 1477.
262 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 842; Ashley, 24 Yale Law Jour. 544.
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A tendency may be noted in the more recent decisions to
allow a servant discharged for cause to recover on quantum
meruit for the value of the part performance, subject to an off-
set for damages caused by his misconduct. An employee may
give good cause for discharge, for want of skill or strength,
while honestly endeavoring to fulfill his contract. Consequently,
recovery has been sometimes allowed to a discharged employee
where it would be denied to one guilty of willful abandon-
ment..2 7 A dishonest servant who has stolen his employer's money
may be promptly discharged and he will forfeit all rights to
compensation for services during the period in which the dis-
honesty occurred. But if the employer keeps the plaintiff in his
service after notice of his misconduct, he waives all right to for-
feit his wages.
28
Contracts for the sale of goods seem to afford an exception
to the general rule that a quasi contractual claim will not be
raised in favor of one who has willfully broken his contract. If
the seller delivers to the buyer a less quantity of goods than he
contracted to sell, he may recover, by the weight of authority,
the reasonable value of the part delivered less the damages oc-
casioned by his default in making complete performance.2 ' The
recovery is not allowed upon the express contract but upon
quantum valebat,30 to obviate the injustice of allowing the buyer
to retain the benefit of the goods without paying for them. 31
Under the Uniform Sales Act,32 if the buyer retains the goods
delivered knowing that the seller is not going to perform the
contract in full, he must pay for them at the contract rate. If,
however, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods delivered
before he knows that the seller is not going to perform his con-
tract in full, the buyer will not be liable for more than the fair
value to him of the goods so received.
A person may in part performance of a contract have given
the other party land, goods, labor and materials, money or
27Hildebrand v. American Fine Arts Co., (1901) 109 Wis. 171, 85
N. W. 268.
28 Person v. McCargar, (1904) 92 Minn. 294, 99 N. W. 885.
29 Saunders v. Short, (1898) 86 Fed. 225, 30 C .C. A. 462; Mead v.
Rat Portage Lumber Co., (1904) 93 Minn. 343, 101 N. W. 299.
30 McCurry v. Purgason, (1915) 170 N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244; Ann.
Cas. 1918 A 997.
31 Oxendale v. Wetherell, (1829) 2 Barn & C. 386, 109 Eng. Rep. 143;
United States v. Molloy, (1906) 144 Fed. 321, 11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 487;




services. Why should the rights of one in default be different
as to one kind of part performance than another? Why should
a seller who has willfully broken his contract, be allowed to re-
cover the reasonable value of the portion of the goods delivered,
while other persons who have broken a contract cannot sue for
benefits conferred by them? Which is the correct rule? Some
consistent principle should be adopted and followed.
It is generally held where a purchaser of land or goods enters
upon the performance of his contract to purchase and makes
default after paying part of the price, that he cannot recover
the money so paid.3   Thus in Sanders v. Brock,34 is was held
that the vendor of land was not liable to a defaulting purchaser
to restore to him two thousand dollars paid as part of the pur-
chase money, even though the vendor had resold the property
for a price largely in excess of the sum agreed to be paid by the
plaintiff and was not damaged by his default. In this case, how-
ever, the plaintiff had declined to complete his contract. If the
purchaser had reconsidered his refusal and tendered payment
to the vendor before resale, he might possibly have put him to
his election to perform the contract or return the payments re-
ceived.
The right to recover so much of the payments made as ex-
ceeds the damages suffered by the other party has been allowed in
some cases. 35 Thus in Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch36
it was held that a plaintiff may recover to the extent that he has
benefitted the defendant by part performance of the contract
which he has failed to carry, out, his recovery being subject to
recoupment of damages sustained by the defendant. As Lurton,
J, says :
"In justice defendants have no right to more of the money than
will compensate them for loss by- reason of plaintiff's refusal to
carry out the contract."
But recovery would be denied in most jurisdictions, probably
without regard to the reason why plaintiff made default, whether
it was willful or through misfortune.38
33 McManus v. Blackmarr, (1891) 47 Minn. 331, 50 N. W. 230.
34 (1911) 230 Pa. 609, 79 Ati. 772, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 532.
3 3 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1476.
36 (1906) 143 Fed. 929.
37 See also Cherry Valley Iron Co. v. Florence, etc., Co., (1894) 64
Fed. 569, 574, 12 C. C. A. 306; McDonough v. Evans M. Co., (1902) 112
Fed. 634, 637; 50 C.-C. A. 403; Clark v. Moore, (1853) 3 Mich. 55, 58, 281;
Wilson v. Wagar, (1873) 26 Mich. 452; Sabas v. Gregory, (1916) 91
Conn. 26. 98 Atl. 293; Hayes v. Jordan, (1890) 85 Ga. 741, 9 L. R. A. 378.
38 3 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1476.
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It is the general rule, as we have seen, in the case of an entire
contract, that if one party stops without excuse before full per-
formance, he cannot recover anything for the value of the serv-
ices actually rendered." If, on the other hand, the contract is
"divisible" or "severable," the court can allow recovery for the
rateable portion of the work done or performance rendered less
damages for the breach. 40 Thus, if the contract can be construed
as divisible, exact justice may be achieved. The plaintiff will be
paid for what he has done and the defendant can deduct damages
for defects in the performance. As Mitchell, J., says in
McGrath v. Cannon :41
"In view of the harshness of the rule which prevents one who
has failed fully to perform his contract from recovering any-
thing for past performance, the benefits of which the defendant
has received, the courts are inclined, whenever they consistently
can, to construe a contract as severable rather than entire.
. This works out substantial justice and permits the one party
to recover for what he has performed, but at the same time per-
mits the other party to counter-claim or recoup whatever dam-
ages he has sustained by the non-performance of the other items
of the contract."
If, on the other hand, the contract is entire, the defendant
may retain the part performance without either paying or do-
ing anything for it, though the value is out of all proportion to
the damages he has suffered by non-completion. Thus in the
case of Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, 2 the plaintiffs, the owners of a
thresher, contracted to thresh all defendant's crop of grain at so
much per bushel. Before th& entire crop had been threshed, the
plaintiffs hauled the machine away and refused to thresh more,
for the reason that they were losing money. Three hundred acres
of grain were left in shock. Plaintiffs sued for the work and
threshing they had done at the agreed price per bushel. It was
held that they could not recover here either on the contract it-
self or on quantum meruit for part performance. Where the
plaintiff willfully and without just cause refuses to complete a
contract, or there is a substantial departure from its terms, there
can be no partial recovery. The contract was held to be entire,
not divisible, in spite of the fact that compensation ,was fixed at
39 National Knitting Co. v. Bouton & Co., (1909) 141 Wis. 63, 123 N.
W. 624; Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Eaton & Co., (1897) 165 Ill. 550, 46 N.
E. 449.
40 Stubbs v. Holywell Ry. Co., (1867) L. R. 2 Ex. 311.
41 (1893) 55 Minn. 457, 56 N. W. 97.
42 (1908) 106 Minn. 202, 118 N. W. 797, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1069.
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so much per bushel. In Lynn v. Seby,43 and in McMillan v.-Mal-
loy,44 however, which were also cases of threshing contracts, al-
though the contracts were held to be "entire," yet recovery was
allowed for the value of the work done, less damages.45
What is the test to distinguish entire and divisible contracts?
Mitchell, J., says in McGrath v. Cannon :46
"Whether a contract is entire or severable, like all questions of
construction, depends on the intention of the parties, and must
be determined in each case by considering the language employed
and the subject-matter of the contract, and how the parties
themselves have treated it."
But it has been pointed out that courts ascribe to the parties an
intention based on what a reasonable expectation as to their re-
spective rights, duties, or remedies would be under the contin-
gency which has happened, and determine the entirety or divisi-
bility of a contract accordingly.47 To discuss the matter in these
"chameleonic" terms usually obscures the real issue. It would
be preferable to deal with the question frankly in terms of rules
based on fairness rather than of fictitiously imputed intentions.
A contract may be regarded as entire for one purpose and
severable for another. This being so, the attempt to classify con-
tracts as entire and divisible results in much bewilderment and
confusion. Severable or divisible may be used simply as indi-
cating that a portion of the price is, by the terms of the agree-
ment, set off against a portion of the goods; or in general, that
the consideration on each side is- apportionable and that the
price for any part performance may be ascertained by compu-
tation at a certain rate.48 "Entire contract" is sometimes used in
the sense that the seller is bound to furnish all the goods, or that
the servant is bound to do all the work before demanding any
pay, or in other words, that payment is to be made only after
complete performance. 49  This is contrasted with a contract
where a debt immediately arises when part of the performance
has been rendered. "Entire" may, on the other hand, be used
to indicate that the buyer must either take all of the goods or re-
43 (1915) 29 N. Dak. 420, 151 N. W. 31.
44 (1880) 10 Nebr. 228, 4 N. W. 1004.
45 See also Riech v. Bolch, (1886) 68 Iowa 526, 27 N. W. 507.
46 (1893) 55 Minn. 457, 57 N. W. 150.
472 Am. L. Rep. 643 n.; 2 Williston, Contracts, secs. 825, 1611.
48Williston, Sales, sec. 804; 2 Williston, Contracts, secs. 861, 1028.
49 Baker v. Higgins, (1860) 21 N. Y. 397; Bentley v. Edwards, (1914)
125 Minn. 179, 146 N. W. 347, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 254.
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ject them all, and cannot accept the portion which is of proper
grade and reject the balance. 50
The most common use of the terms "entire" and "divisible,"
however, especially in the present connection, is with reference
to the question whether a breach as to one portion or installment
of the contract is an excuse (1) from the duty to'go on with
the contract, and (2) from the duty to pay for what has been
received.51 Where goods are sold to be delivered in installments,
it is in general presumed that the contract -was made in contem-
plation of full performance. In a contract of employment by the
year, to entitle the plaintiff to recover the specified wages for
any one month, he must have substantially performed his duties
for that month. But if the plaintiff, before the expiration of the
year, abandons the service without excuse or by his own willful
fault, can he recover nothing for the previous months which he
has worked ?
It would seem that the courts are engaged in a fruitless effort
in the attempt to classify contracts in and of themselves as entire
or divisible. It is not the nature of the contract, but the nature
-and effect of the breach which controls the question. The terms
used describe the result rather than the cause, the thing to be
explained rather than the explanation. 3 The true test of the
right to, recover cannot be found in the unity of the performance
or in the terms of the contract or the apportionment of the con-
sideration or the intention of the parties, but only in the just
effect of the breach under the circumstances. What, then, should
be the effect of breach after part performance? Where a breach
occurs at the outset, (in limine) a stricter rule obtains than
after part performance. A proposition is laid down in the notes
to Pordage v. Cole14 as the reason of the decision in Boone v.
Evre and similar cases, as follows:
"Where a person has received a part of the consideration for
which he entered into the agreement, it would be unjust that
because he has not had the whole, he should therefore be permit-
50 2 Am. L. Rep. 643, 655 n.
512 Am. L. Rep. 641 n.
52 Peterson v. Mayer, (1891) 46 Minn. 468, 45 N. W. 245; Diefenback
v. Starck, (1883) 56 Wis. 462, 14 N. W. 621; Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, (1908)106 Minn. 202, 118 N. W. 797, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1069; 2 Williston,
Contracts, secs. 862, 872.
'5 See F. C. Woodward, Doctrine of Divisible Contracts, 39 Am. L.
Reg. (N.S.) 1.
r4 1 Williams' Saunders, 555.
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ted to enjoy that part without either paying or doing anything
for it.
"Therefore, the law obliges him to perform the agreement on
his part, and leaves him to his remedy to recover any damages
he may have sustained in not having received the whole consider-
ation."
This is true only of substantial performance. It is not true
as this quotation seems to imply, that a partial performance will
enable a party to enforce a contract, or that a material breach
after part performafice is not a ground of rescission. But there
is no such dilemma, as seems to be implied, between permitting
a party to retain all the benefits of part performance without
compensation, or requiring him to perform the rest of the con-
tract on his part. On the contrary, when the plaintiff is guilty
of a material breach he cannot insist on further performance
and compel the defendant to resort to an action for damages.
The breach will operate to excuse the duty of the defendant to
perform further, unless he elects to do so.55 The injured party
should be allowed to refuse to go on with the contract in so far
as it is still wholly executory. But so long as he has received
and retains a portion of the performance, he should ordinarily
be bound to make compensation, after the manner of divisible
contracts, in spite of the default as to the rest of the contract.
56
As to the executed portions of the contract, the ques-
tion should be whether the injured party has received sub-
stantial benefits from part performance over and above the dam-
ages caused by the breach, and whether the conduct of the plain-
tiff is so culpable that the policy of the law demands a denial of
all relief by way of penalty. As to the executory portions of the
contract, the other party may well be excused by any material
breach."7
We may conclude, then, that on principle even so called entire
contracts should be treated as "divisible," after part performance
has been accepted, in the sense that the value of the portions re-
ceived must be paid for, even though the rest of the contract is
not performed, subject to the deduction of damages. Breach of
55 H. D. Williams Cooperage Co. v. Scofield, (1902) 115 Fed. 119, 123,
53 C. C. A. 23; Clarke Contracting Co. v. City of New York, (N.Y. 1920)
128 N. E. 241.
56 See 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 872.
572 Am. L. Rep. 665-669; 1 Black, Rescission of Contracts, sec. 215;
24 R. C. L. 279; Auer v. Twitchell, Robinson P. Co., (Me. 1920) 111
At. 570.
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a condition implied in law should not be permitted to defeat
one's quasi contractual claim to recover compensation on quan-
tum meruit or valebat for benefits conferred by part perform-
ance, unless possibly in case of bad faith or willful breach.5 8 It
is only by recognizing the distinction between the effect of breach
as to the executed and executory portions of the contract that
arbitrary and unjust forfeitures may be avoided. A material
breach after part performance will excuse further performance
by the injured party, but should not necessarily penalize the de-
faulting party by the forfeiture of all compensation for such
part performance as he has rendered. The measure of damages
for breach of contract should be the same in all cases.
II. RELIEF AGAINST EXPRESS STIPULATIONS.
The law, while looking with righteous abhorrence on for-
feitures, and washing its hands of their enforcement, after the
manner of Pontius Pilate, yet has been reluctant to intervene
with affirmative relief or to formulate any consistent principle
condemning the validity of cut-throat provisions which in their
essence involve forfeiture. Although the law will not assist in
the vivisection of the victim, it will often permit the creditor to
keep his pound of flesh if he can carve it for himself. 59
It is an anomaly in the law that in some cases it will relieve
from a forfeiture in the teeth of any provision which calls for one,
and in other cases, similar in principle, it will meekly acquiesce
while hard fisted creditors take advantage of the slips of the
unfortunate. The vigorous policy of equity with reference to
bonds and mortgages has not been carried out consistently in
contracts generally. The maxim, "once a mortgage always a
mortgage," expresses the principle that redemption will be al-
lowed in spite of any agreement that the mortgaged property
shall be forfeited. All clogs on the equity of redemption are
futile.60 But as Professor Williston points out in his recent note-
worthy treatise,6 ' the principle which prohibits the enforcement
of forfeitures and penalties in mortgages and bonds has not been
applied to situations similar in principle that arise from con.di-
58 Woodward, Quasi Contracts, 267; Keener, Quasi Contracts, 225; Dane
v. Wood, (1905) 73 N. H. 222, 60 Atl. 744, 70 L. R. A. 133; Rosenthal P.
Co. v. National, etc. Co., (1919) 226 N. Y. 313, 123 N. E. 766.
59 Pence v. Tide Water T. Corp., (Va. 1920) 103 S. E. 694.
60 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 771; 3 Story, Equity, 14th Ed., sec. 1728;
Samuel v. Jarrah, etc., Corp., [1904] A. C. 323.
81 2 Williston, Contracts, Chap. XXV.
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tions in other contracts. "Neither law nor equity has dealt ade-
quately with oppressive installment contracts. ' 62  As Professor
Williston says :63
"It should not be admitted that a court of equity today has an in-
ferior instinct for natural justice or an inferior power to give
effect to it, than Chancellors possessed three centuries ago."
The law carefully limits the remedies which the parties may
provide for themselves by way of penalty, though called "liqui-
dated damages." 64  But an express condition precedent may of-
ten involve a loss or forfeiture, "as penal in its effects as a prom-
ise to pay a penalty." 65 This is strikingly the case in instalment
contracts where time is declared to be "of the essence," and
the buyer of land or goods may be subjected to a forfeiture of
all the payments he has made. Yet it is generally laid down that
an express condition precedent must be literally and exactly
performed and any breach will excuse the duty of performance
by the other party. 6 Even impossibility will not ordinarily ex-
cuse breach of condition precedent, such as the payment of a life
insurance premium by a certain day.67 Here also a distinction
may be drawn between what is executory and what is executed.
It has been recognized where impossibility to comply with a
condition precedent of an insurance policy was caused by war,
and the insured would lose the benefit of the money previously
paid for premiums without his fault, that in such a case the in-
sured was entitled to relief from forfeiture. The United States
Supreme Court enforced a quasi contractual right to the cash
surrender value of the policy, though no such right was reserved,
on the ground that it would not be just for the insurance com-
pany to retain the money received and forfeit the equitable value
of the policy.68
The courts of law as well as courts of equity are at liberty
to disregard express conditions where they are harsh and penal
62William H. Loyd, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 123.
63 2 Williston on -Contracts, 1475, secs 791, 793.
"64Quigley v. C. S. Bracket, (1914) 124 Minn. 366, 145 N. W. 29; 34
L. R. A. (N.S.) 4, 13.
65 2 Williston, Contracts, secs. 776, 793.
66 Kelly v. Sun Fire Office, (1891) 141 Pa. St. 10, 21, 21 Atl. 447.
67 Klein v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1881) 104 U. S. 88, 26 L. Ed.
662; 2 Williston, Contracts, secs. 808, 809.68 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, (1876) 93 U. S. 24, 32, 23 L.
Ed. 789.
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in their effects and provide for a penalty or forfeiture.60  As
Professor Williston says :70
"The court often under the disguise of the construction is in
fact giving relief from the terms of the contract on principles
analogous to those which have influenced courts of equity in re-
lieving from forfeiture."
Where a condition is inserted to enforce punctual perform-
ance of a duty it should be considered merely as remedial or ac-
cessory, and be relieved against upon payment of the damages
actually incurred. The question should not turn on whether the
condition is subsequent or precedent, as this is a matter of form,
and the law should look at the substance and at the main object
of the contract.7 '
It has been held in some cases that the doctrine of substan-
tial performance of building contracts has no application to
cases where an architect's certificate is made a condition prece-
dent to the liability of the owner, and that the mere use of the
building is not an acceptance of work or a waiver of the produc-
tion of an architect's certificate. 72  But other courts refuse t o
enforce the express condition strictly, and adopt the rule of sub-
stantial performance from implied conditions to dispense with
the express condition. 73 The presentation of the certificate is in
itself of no value. The loss of the builder's labor and material
for a slight default involves a forfeiture, and the owner cannot
unjustly enrich himself by the enforcement of the condition. If
no forfeiture would result, the condition will be strictly en-
forced.74
A provision forfeiting all wages which may be due at the
time of leaving, if the employee leaves without certain notice,
not confining the amount to any fixed sum or proportion of the
wages for the year, or for any given time, is not reasonable and
will not be enforced. It is a harsh and oppressive exaction where
the forfeiture might cover a very long period.75  The law will
69 Ashley, Contracts, 170; 4 Columbia L. Rep. 423; 6 R. C. L. 906.
70 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 806. See also A. L. Corbin,'28 Yale L.
Jour. 753; Gates v. Parmley, (1896) 93 Wis. 294, 306, 307, 66 N. W. 253.71 Loyd Cases on Certain Equitable Doctrines, 14, 49 n.; 29 Harv. L.
Rep. 123.
72 Pope v. King, (1908) 108 Md. 37, 69 Atl. 417, 16 L. R. A. (N.S.)
489.
732 Williston, Contracts, secs. 805, 842.74 Birch Cooley v. First National Bank, (1902) 86 Minn. 385, 90
N. W. 789.
75 Richardson v. Woehler, (1872) 26 Mich. 90; Schrimpf v. Tenn.
Mf. Co. (1887) 86 Tenn. 219, 6 S. W. 131.
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not permit a party to stipulate for a remedy by way of self help
by which the other will suffer an arbitrary loss, disproportionate
to the injury, and by which he may enrich himself by the oppres-
sion of another. The English courts, however, in the famous
old case of Cutter v. Powell,76 decided in 1795, held that no
wages could be recovered although the plaintiff had performed
his duties as second mate until the day of his death and had
completed two-thirds of the voyage, because of an express con-
dition by which a lump sum was payable "provided he proceeds,
continues and does his duty as second mate from hence to the
port of Liverpool."
Very severe forfeitures are permitted by the law of most
jurisdictions in contracts for the conditional sale of chattels,
and the equitable principle which forbids a forfeiture is ignored.
The seller is allowed to resume possession without rescinding
the contract or returning the payments made, even though he
may already have collected the major part of the contract
pricey.7  In some cases, however, it is held that even if there is
an express provision for forfeiture uppn default, the seller can-
not have the property and the payments too, but must account
for the excess of payments over the damages he has suffered.7 8
It has been held in Minnesota that it is not a condition prece-
dent to replevin that the seller return or tender back partial pay-
ments made or notes given.7 1 Whether partial payments made
by the buyer are forfeited, in the absence of a provision to that
effect in the contract, was not decided.
Statutes have been enacted in several states to prevent the
injustice to the buyer of permitting a forfeiture where most of
the price has been paid."' Such protection should be afforded
the buyer in spite of any attempt in the contract to surrender
it."- The essential character of a conditional sale is that of a
76 (1814) 6 T. R. 320.
772 Williston, Contracts, sec. 374; Clark v. Barnard, (1883) 108 U. S.
436, 27 L. Ed. 780, 2 S. C. R. 878.
7s Preston v. Whitney, (1871) 23 Mich. 260; S. D. Puffer & Sons Co.
v. Lucas, (1893) 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 174, 19 L. R. A. 681; Hays v.
Jordan, (1890) 85 Ga. 741, 11 S. E. 833, 9 L. R. A. 373; Pierce v. Staub,
(1906) 78 Conn. 459, 62 Atl. 760, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 785. Compare
Pfeiffer v. Norman, (1911) 22 N. Dak. 168, 133 N. W. 97, 38 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 891.
79 Raymond Co. v. Kahn, (1914) 124 Minn. 426, 145 N. W. 164.
80 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 899 n.
812 Williston, Contracts, sec. 738; Desseau v. Holmes, (1905) 187
Mass. 486, 73 N. E. 656, 105 A. S. R. 417.
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sale with a mortgage back, and the danger of forfeiture is the
same.82
In land contracts time is frequently declared to be of the
essence of the contract, and it is provided that the failure of
punctual payments of installments will be fatal. The vendor
by the literal terms of the contract is armed with power to in-
sist upon forfeiture upon failure of the buyer to pay a single
dollar of the price at the exact time prescribed. Where time
is of the essence, a clause providing that in case of default in
payment of an installment when due, all payments shall be
and remain the property of the seller is valid and binding. A
failure to perform on the day stipulated ipso facto involves a
forfeiture, without the necessity of notice or any affirmative
act on the part of the vendor.8 3  In some cases, however, it
is held that a mere failure to pay the purchase money according
to the terms of the agreement will not produce a forfeiture
without the tender of a deed to 'put the purchaser in default. 4
By the great weight of American authority no relief can be
afforded against express conditions precedent inflicting for-
feiture where the contract makes time of the essence, although
the delay may be very slight and although the buyer has paid
a large part of the price and has greatly improved the land.85
The vendor is entitled to the land, with all improvements, fix-
tures and growing crops, and in addition to the purchase money
already paid.
In a recent Minnesota case86 it was held that a vendee who
defaults in payments due under a land contract and announces
82 R C. Bartley Co. v. Lee, (1915) 87 N. J. L. 19, 93 Atl. 78.
83 But see 107 A. S. R. 726 n.; Waite v, Stanley, (1914) 88 Vt. 407,
92 Atl. 633, L. R. A. 1916C 886, 893; Vito v. Birkel, (1904) 209 Pa. St.
206, 58 Atl. 127.
84 Frink v. Thomas, (1891) 20 Ore. 265, 25 Pac. 717, 12 L. R. A. 239;
Wells-Fargo Co. v. Fage, (1905) 48 Ore. 74, 80, 83 Pac. 856, 3 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 103; Reese v: Westfield, (1909) 56 Wash. 415, 105 Pac. 837, 28
L. R. A. (N.S.) 956; O'Connor v. Hughes, (1886) 35 Minn. 446, 29
N. W. 152.
85 True v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1914) 126 Minn. 72; 147 N. W.
948; Glock v. Howard, (1898) 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713; Pomeroy, Equity,
4th Ed., sec. 455, secs. 222, 228; Skookum Oil Co. v. Thomas, (1912)
162 Cal. 539, 123 Pac. 363, L. R. A. 1918B 551 n.; Heckard v. Sayre,
(1864) 34 Ill. 142; Cheney v. Bilby, (1896) 74 Fed. 52, 20 C. C. A. 291;
2 Williston, Contracts, 1517; Hurley v. Anicker, (1915) 51 Okla. 97,
151 Pac. 593, L. R. A. 1918B 538, 540 n. On right of vendee to recover
payments when in default; Ames, Cases on Equity, 341 n.; Eastern
Oregon Land Co. v. Moody, (1912) 198 Fed. 7.
86 Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, (Minn. 1920) 180 N. W.
227.
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his inability to complete the contract, is not entitled to a return
of the down payment made when the contract was signed; nor
can the court in equity require a return of the money by the
vendor as a condition of the cancellation of the contract. In
this case the purchaser had been drafted into the United States
army and was killed in action on the battlefields of France. He
left no estate, and when the vendor sued for a specific per-
formance or a cancellation against his administrator, the admin-
istrator pleaded inability to complete and asked the refundment
of the advance payments; but relief was denied although the
payments made exceeded the vendor's damages.
Suppose a purchaser has contracted for a house or a farm
to be paid for by installments and no conveyance is to be made
until all the installments are paid. It is declared to be a condi-
tion precedent that all payments must be punctually made on
the very day they fall due, and on the failure to pay any in-
stallment when due, all obligations of the vendor shall be at
an end and all previous payments forfeited as liquidated dam-
ages. Time is declared to be of the.essence of the contract. Let
us suppose that the purchaser under such a contract has been
in possession for years, has paid a large portion of the pur-
chase price and has expended thousands of dollars in improve-
ments on the land, and then by forgetfulness, or some other
accidental cause, omits to pay the last installment of one thou-
sand dollars by the exact hour prescribed by the contract. He
is ready with the money in his hands an hour or a day after
the default, offers it to the vendor and implores him to take
it; .yet under the doctrine of many American courts, he may be
doomed to see the whole of his estate, the reward of years of
toil and effort, entirely swept away from him in a moment by
the unbending rule of law as to forfeiture where time is made
of the essence of the contract.87
In the leading case of Glock v. Howard,88 Justice Henshaw,
in speaking of the remedies open to the vendor under such a
contract, says:
"Still resting upon the contract, he may remain inactive, and
yet retain to his own use the moneys paid by the vendee, so
that it is of no moment whether or not the contract declares that
87 See Edgerton v. Peckhamn, (1844) 11 Paige (N.Y.) 352; Cheney
v. Bilby, (1896) 74 Fed. 52, 60.
s8 (1898) 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713.
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such moneys shall upon breach be forfeited as liquidated dam-
ages.
"If his generosity prompts him to do so, he may agree with
the vendee for a mutual abandonment and rescission, in which
case the vendee in default would be entitled to a repayment
of his money."
Even if specific performance must be denied, an equitable or
a quasi contractual right to recover previous payments and the
value of improvements, subject to deduction for any use and
possession enjoyed and any damages caused, should surely be rec-
ognized to prevent a forfeiture s 9 Otherwise the law becomes
the passive accessory of any Shylock who chooses to wrest from
a purchaser an estate which he has almost paid for by reason
of some minor default.
The relation of the vendor and purchaser of land, under
a wholly executory contract, has been likened to the relation of
mortgagor and mortgagee. The analogy is especially close when
the buyer is given possession and enjoyment of the land. The
vendor's true remedy is foreclosure, even where time is made of
the essence. But the right to relief from forfeiture is not de-
pendent on the exactitude of this analogy, as there is no reason
why such relief should be confined to bonds and mortgages.
In recent decisions the English Privy Council has held that
while the purchaser in -default may not be entitled to specific
performance under a contract where time is made of the es-
sence, nevertheless a return of the advance payments should be
allowedf 1 This eminent court held that forfeiture of the money
paid under the contract was a penalty from which relief might
be granted on proper terms. It Was pointed out that the pen-
alty would become more and more severe as the performance
approached completion, and the money liable to confiscation would
become larger. If time is made of essence, the purchaser to se-
cure his rights under the contract, must perform within the stip-
ulated time. But equity in denying specific performance will
require the seller to repay the portions of the price which he has
received. The purchase money paid is to be regarded only as se-
curity for the true amount of damages which the vendor has
89See Bradley, J., in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, (1876)
93 U. S. 24, 32, 23 L. Ed. 789; 2 Williston, Contracts, 1550 n.90 Lytle v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., (1905) 122 Ga. 458, 50
S. E. 402; 2 Williston, Contracts, sec. 791; 1 Pomeroy, Equity Juris-
diction, 4th Ed., sec. 368.
91 Steedman v. Drinkle, [1916] 1 A. C. 275.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
suffered by the purchaser's breach. This seems especially clear
where the purchaser is ready and willing to pay the balance of
the price and desires specific performance, but the vendor claims
forfeiture of land and money on the basis of some slight delay.9 2
In some jurisdictions, particularly in the western provinces
of Canada, provisions for forfeiture of payments in land con-
tracts are held to be invalid, either at common law or by statute,
and the court will order the defendant to restore what he has
received in part payment less actual damages.9 3  These courts
will not permit the vendor to paralyze judicial power by the in-
sertion of the magic phrase that "time is of the essence of the
contract."
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a declaration
of rescission and a declaration of termination or forfeiture. The
serious breach by one party may be treated by the other as a
ground of rescission, authorizing him to disaffirm the contract.
If he rescinds, the contract is avoided ab initio, and the other
party is entitled to be put in statu quo. The idea of rescission
implies that what has been given shall be restored. Where the
vendor, upon default, elects to rescind the contract, there is no
forfeiture of payments made by the vendee.94
In Pierce v. Staub,95 the vendor, with inordinate greed, claimed
a forfeiture of sixty thousand dollars without any showing that
he had lost a dollar by reason of the default of the vendee. It
was held that a rescission had been effected by the notice of the
termination of the contract. The notice of the termination was
said to be equivalent to a formal or mutual rescission, and,
therefore, the vendor could not retain advance payments, at least
in the absence of a forfeiture clause.
According to many courts, however, mere notice of default
or forfeiture, demand of possession, re-entry or even an action
to cancel the contract and quiet title, do not constitute a rescis-
sion entitling the vendee to recover payments made.9" It is
92 53 Can. L. Journal, 161, 166; Labelle v. O'Connor, (1908) 15 Ont.
L. Rep. 519, 536.
93 Brown v. Verzani, (1917) 181 Iowa 237, 244, 164 N. W. 601; Price
v. Ruggles, (1917) 28 Manitoba L. Rep. 132; Brown v. Walsh, (1919)
45 Ont. L. Rep. 646; Moodie v. Young, (1908) 1 Alberta L. Rep. 337;
Barnes v. Clement, (1896) 8 S. Dak. 421, 12 S. Dak. 270, 81 N. W. 30.
94 Frink v. Thomas, (1891) 20 Ore. 265, 25 Pac. 717, 12 L. R. A. 239.
95 (1906) 78 Conn. 459, 62 Atl. 760, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 785.
96List v. Moore, (1912) 20 Cal. App. 616, 129 Pac. 962; Newell v.
Stone Co., (Cal. 1920) 184 Pac. 659, 9 Am. L. Rep. 993; Malloy v. Muir,
(1901) 62 Nebr. 80, 86 N. W. 916.
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well, however, for the vendor to be careful of the language he
uses when he declares the contract terminated. In Waters v.
Pearsoiz,97 on the other hand, it was held that if the seller elects
to keep the land and to terminate the contract because of the
buyer's default, he cannot withhold advance payments on the
ground of forfeiture, although he may apply them to satisfaction
of his actual damages.98
In Lytle v. Scottish-Amnerican Mortgage Co.99 it was held that
although the contract itself provides for the retaking of posses-
sion on default and the forfeiture of advance paymenti, never-
theless, when the vendor terminates the contract for default of
the vendee, the latter is entitled to an accounting for payments
and improvements made. If, on default, the vendor seeks to
recover the land, he must account to the vendee for the purchase
money. His action in retaking possession is a rescission.
The tendency of the law is to deny to a defaulting vendee
reimbursement. But in this case Lamar, J., gives one of the
best discussions on the subject of forfeiture to be found in
the books. The court acutely summarizes and criticizes the view
upholding a provision for forfeiture of the purchase money
or improvements on termination of the contract. The court
says :100
"Those holding this view insist that not to enforce a stipula-
tion for forfeiture is to interfere with the right of contract; that
to permit the vendee as plaintiff or defendant to recover the
value of improvements made or to regain money previously paid,
leaves the vendor where he cannot know whether the land is
sold or not; forces him, during the credit period, to be ready at
all times to refund the money paid; enables the vendee to take
advantage of his own wrong, so that if the land increases in
value, he can insist on performance, while if the market price
declines, he will cease to make payments, and upon the exer-
cise of the reserved right to rescind, the vendee will then de-
mand the return of what has been previously lawfully paid, or
seek reimbursement for improvements which have become a part
of the real estate."
The court answers these contentions as follows:
"To the extent 6f the land sold, the improvements thereon, the
money in the hands of the vendor received of the vendee, and
also to the extent of the vendee's general estate, the law guar-
97 (1914) 163 Iowa 391, 144 N. W. 1026.
98 See L. R. A. 1918B 544 n; L. R. A. 1916C 893 n.
99 (1905) 122 Ga. 458, 50 S. E. 402.
100 (1905) 122 Ga. 458, 50 S. E. 402.
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antees the vendor against loss if he sues to recover the pur-
chase price. He is not obliged to rescind. But when he does
exercise that right, he discharges the vendee from liability under
the contract, sets aside the sale, and is entitled to a return of the
property subject only to the condition that as his status has been
restored, he must also restore the status of the vendee.101 The
vendee is not entitled to a return of his purchase money until
he has allowed, as a deduction therefrom, all damages causedby his breach--one element of which will be the fair rental value
of the property during the time he occupied it. But when hehas done this, that is all that the law requires. Damages for
the breach, payment of the rent, and a return of the land restore
the vendor to his status.
"The prohibition against the exaction of penalty and enforce-
ment of forfeiture is not alone for the benefit of those who have
kept their contracts. They do not need it. The effort to enforce
a penalty and forfeiture is generally against a party who is de-
linquent."1o2
It would seem equitable to hold that a party cannot treat a
contract as terminated so as to resume the property which he has
parted with and at the same time keep the money which he has
received as the consideration for it. In like manner, the pur-
chaser cannot retain possession of the land or other part per-
formance which he has received- and at the same time defend
payment of his note for the purchase price on the ground of de-
fective title. He must either rescind or rely on a cross action
for damages.' 3
Statutory provisions are badly needed to give purchasers
of land and chattels more effective protection against forfeiture.
By Minnesota law,1"4 thirty days' notice must be given of an in-
tention to terminate a land contract for default. It is held that this
proceeding is in effect a strict foreclosure of the contract and
that a tender made after the. expiration of thirty days is of no
avail. The provision was enacted to prevent persons having
rights under executory contracts for the purchase of lands from
being cut off too abruptly upon failure to meet installments due
101 Civil Code, secs. 3924, 3712.
°0- See also Lathan v. Davis, (1891) 44 Fed. 862; Compare Raymond
Co. v. Kahn, (1914) 124 Minn. 426, 145 N. W. 164; See also Ann. Cas.
1917C 85 n.
103 Daniels v. Englehart, (1910) 19 Ida. 548, 111 Pac. 3, 39 L. R. A.(N.S.) 938. Compare Lafferty v. Evans, (1906) 17 Okla. 247, 87 Pac.304, 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 363, 369; German Say. Inst. v. De La VergneRef. Mach. Co., (1895) 70 Fed. 146, 17 C. C. A. 34; 5 Page, Contracts,
secs. 2981-2984.
304 G. S. 1913, sec. 8081.
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thereon. It gives the vendee time within which to protect his
rights. 0 1
In Waters v. Pearson,106 it is held that under the Iowa statute
a forfeiture cannot become effective until written notice and
the expiration of thirty days thereafter. "This is a merciful pro-
vision extending a little grace to a party in default who may be
staggering under the load of his undertaking." The court fur-
ther held in this case that a provision for forfeiture is invalid.
"If the vendor's damages be less than the advance payments, we
know of no sound reason of law or morals why the vendee should
not recover the balance remaining." If the vendor elects to ter-
minate the contract and keep the land instead of insisting on
specific performance, he must account for advance payments in
excess of the damages.
In California, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota,
there is a code provision that whenever by the terms of an obli-
gation a party thereto incurs a forfeiture by reason of his failure
to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom upon
making full compensation to the other party, except in case of a
grossly negligent, willful or fraudulent breach of duty. In Clif-
ton v. Wilson 07 it is stated that this provision is consonant with
the theory of compensation which prohibits parties to contracts
from stipulating therein for forfeitures. 08 This provision does
not seem to have been effective, however, to afford adequate
protection against forfeiture1'0
In Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, British Columbia and Sas-
katchewan there are statutory provisions as to relief against pen-
alties and forfeitures and the termination of land contracts. The
courts may grant relief to a defaulting purchaser where the ven-
dor is attempting to determine the contract and to enforce a for-
feiture in various ways: (1) By rescinding the contract and
directing the vendor to return all moneys paid less damages; (2)
by decreeing specific performance with compensation;. (3) by
foreclosure, appointing a day for redemption, and in default
either strict foreclosure or sale; or (4) granting an extension of
105 International R. Co. v. Vanderpoel, (1914) 127 Minn. 89, 148 N. W.
895.
10 (1914) 163 Iowa 391, 144 N. W. 1026.
107 (1913) 47 Mont. 305, 132 Pac. 424.
108 See Fratt v. Daniels-Jones Co., (1913) 47 Mont. 287, 133 Pac.
700; Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, (1913) 47 Mont. 289, 133 Pac. 694.
109 Suburban Homes Co. v. North, (1914) 50 Mont. 108, 145 Pac. 2,
Ann. Cas. 1917C 81; cf. Barnes v. Clement, (1899) 12 S. D. 270, 81 N. W.
301.
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time to the purchaser to remedy his default.110  The rights of
the parties are being more and more worked out on the analogy
of the mortgage relation, and the purchaser's right to claim re-
lief against forfeiture has become generally recognized. Amer-
ican courts and legislatures have been left somewhat behind by
our English and Canadian brethren.
Just as the law refuses to individuals the remedy of seeking
redress by self help without resort to the courts, so it should
regulate -the remedies which they provide for themselves to
enforce their contracts, not only by refusing to enforce them, but
also by relieving against unconscionable, oppressive and ruinous
exactions in the nature of penalties and forfeitures.
The traditional reluctance to relieve against conditions prece-
dent as contrasted with conditions subsequent has no basis, it is
submitted, except in so far as the condition may affect what is still
executory as contrasted with what is executed. A distinction may
be drawn between the loss of the right to go on with the contract
or to demand specific performance, and the forfeiture of the bene-
fits of what one has already given or done. The courts might
well, in all cases of part performance, require a rescission upon
just terms, as a condition of the right to terminate a contract and
hold oneself excused from further duty under it.
110 See McCaul, Remedies of Vendors and Purchasers, 2nd Ed., 119,
122, 136; Great W. L. Co. v. Wilkins, (1907) 1 Alberta 155, 167; Cana-
dian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Meadows, (1908) 1 Alberta L; Rep. 344; Pro-
vincial S. Co. v. Gratias, (1919) 12 Sask. 155; Hall v. Turnbull, (1909)
2 Sask. L. R. 89.
